There's a widely held belief that closers on crappy teams are often better candidates in fantasy baseball because they will have more opportunities to close games. The logic is that even the worst baseball teams will win at least 65-70 games and considering the teams these closers are on are so bad, at least half of those games will be won by three runs or less- giving the closer on the crappy team many opportunities to get save opportunities and saves.
Well I don't buy it.
I wish I was smarter so I can do regression analysis or some mathematical formula to prove or disprove this theory, but sadly I can not. However, what I can do is present empirical data to help prove my point.
Personally, I am under the belief that closers will nail down saves based upon how talented and healthy they are- independent of how talented the other 24 men on their roster are. If you are healthy all season then that presents more opportunities you can get to save games and if you are talented enough you will not only have the skill to not allow runs (and thus get a save) but the chance another bullpen pitcher on your team will become the team's closer will decrease.
Here's a list of guys who were top ten in saves from the past three years.
A quick explanation of the organization of this list. The first number represents how many saves the closer got. The number in "[]" represents how many save opportunities the closer got and the number in "()" after the pitcher's name represents how many wins his team got.
2010
1) 48 [53]- Brian Wilson (92)
2) 47 [50]- Heath Bell (90)
3) 45 [48]- Rafeal Soriano (96)
4) 43 [46]- Joakim Soria (67)
5) 42 [49]- Matt Capps (multiple teams)
6) 40 [41]- Fransisco Cordero (91)
7) 40 [43]- Neftali Feliz (90)
8) 38 [43]- Carlos Marmol (75)
9) 37 [44]- Billy Wagner (91)
10) 37 [44]- Jonathan Papelbon (89)
11) 37 [43]- Kevin Gregg (66)
2009
1) 48 [55]- Brian Fuentes (97)
2) 47 [52]- Joe Nathan (87)
3) 44 [46]- Mariano Rivera (103)
4) 42 [48]- Heath Bell (75)
5) 39 [43]- Fransisco Cordero (78)
6) 38 [43]- Ryan Franklin (91)
7) 38 [41]- Jonathan Papelbon (95)
8) 38 [42]- David Aardsma (85)
9) 38 [45]- Brian Wilson (88)
10) 37 [41]- Trevor Hoffman (80)
2008
1) 62 [69]- Fransisco Rodriguez (100)
2) 44 [51]- Jose Valverde (86)
3) 42 [45]- Joakim Soria (75)
4) 41 [41]- Brad Lidge (92)
5) 41 [46]- Jonathan Papelbon (95)
6) 41 [47]- Brian Wilson (72)
7) 39 [45]- Joe Nathan (88)
8) 39 [40]- Mariano Rivera (89)
9) 34 [40]- Kerry Wood (97)
10) 34 [40]- Fransisco Cordero (74)
Let's break this down even further and gather some fun analysis from this. Out of the 30 closers (although 31 closers were mentioned, I am not including Matt Capps'2010 numbers because he was traded from one of baseball's worst teams to a division winner):
- 73.3% of closers were on a team who finished above .500 (22)
- 26.7% of closers were on a team who finished below .500 (8)
- 46.7% of closers were on a team who finished with 90 wins or more (14)
- 53.3% of closers were on a team who finished with 89 wins or less (16)
- 46.7% of closers were on a team who made it to the playoffs (14)
- 53.3% of closers were on a team who did not make it to the playoffs (16)
At least in recent years, there seems to be no evidence that in order for a closer to rack up the saves, he needs to be on a team that does not get many wins.
The best indicator of closers to become top ten in saves seems to be that their team needs to win at least 82 games. Only eight times was a closer top ten in saves yet his team was under .500 (twice for Joakim Soria and twice for Fransisco Cordero)
When you break the teams even further away from the crappy teams vs. the elite teams you start to see a slight shift in favor of the "you want closers on crappy teams" argument. However, the recent data suggests that this shift is not so wide as not warrant the assumption that closers on bad teams are more valuable or in some way suggest an inverse correlation between how many wins a team has and how many saves the team's closer has.
Only once in the past three years was a closer top ten in saves yet his team's record was bottom five in the league and that was in 2010 where Joakim Soria was 4th in saves yet the Royals had the 5th worst record in baseball.
In the past three seasons the perennial bottom feeders of the league have been the: Pittsburgh Pirates, Washington Nationals, Baltimore Orioles, Kansas City Royals, and Seattle Mariners. Yet only one of these teams has a closer that fits this widely held belief- Joakim Soria. The reason Soria is so good consistently is not because of the team he's on, but because he's one of the top five (if not top three) most talented closers in the game right now.
Before I close, I would like to isolate two closers: Brian Wilson and Fransisco Cordero. Both guys have kept their teams' closer job throughout their career, have gotten consistent save chances, and have been on awful teams and playoff teams. I'd like to do this analysis to show how their teams' winning percentage have affected how many saves they get.
Brian Wilson
2010- Saves: 48 out of 53; Giants wins: 92
2009- Saves: 38 out of 45; Giants wins: 88
2008- Saves: 41 out of 47; Giants win: 72
The year the Giants won the World Series and had their best record in the past three years was also the same year Brian Wilson had a career year in saves and save opportunities. But really, you see the wide disparity between the amount of wins San Fran has had over the past few years yet you do not see that big of a disparity between the save opportunities and the amount of saves Brian Wilson has gotten in that same time frame.
Fransisco Cordero
2010- Saves: 40 out of 48; Reds wins: 91
2009- Saves: 39 out of 43; Reds wins: 78
2008- Saves: 34 out of 40; Reds wins: 74
2007- Saves: 44 out of 51; Brewers wins: 83
2005- Saves: 37 out of 45; Rangers wins: 79
2004- Saves: 49 out of 54; Rangers wins: 89
For Cordero, there seems to be no correlation to how many wins his team gets and how many save opportunities and successful saves he gets.
Both Cordero and Wilson seems to be disprove the notion that you want a closer on a team that doesn't get a lot of wins.
Listen, I'm more than happy to be proven wrong. I fully admit this post and my reasoning is not very scientific. But it seems to me that people who support this notion have no proof to back it up.
All I know is that when I draft closers, I look for guys who are talented and who I think will not lose their jobs to anchor my relief core. I don't look to see how many wins their team will have. In fact, for most of the teams in the league, the amount of wins they're projected to get look wildly different than the amount of wins they actually get.
Sure, I have guys like Frank Fransisco who are injury risks and not all that talented; however, they not only are NOT my team's top two relief pitcher and I also have grabbed their back up (in this case Jon Rauch). Also, I will never ever ever draft a closer like Joe Blow (d.b.a. Joe Borowski) who are awful pitchers yet have "the closer job".
Showing posts with label Closers. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Closers. Show all posts
Where To Draft A Closer?
One of the big lessons you will hear this fantasy baseball season is: Don't overpay for saves. Mainly you will hear this from Matthew Berry but also occasionally from our very own DME. But like every "rule" you will hear about fantasy drafting, there's a counter valid argument and you realize these crazy constants that "you have to do" are pretty dumb. I personally will overpay for saves but I completely understand the counter argument. You can win your league overpaying for saves and you can win your league not overpaying for saves (consequently you can also lose your league doing the same).
The key to any draft and any draft strategy is just picking the right talent in each individual round. Just because Yahoo! or ESPN or whatever site you're using to draft ranks a player 122 or what have you, doesn't necessarily that player will end up being the 122 best player. That player might end up being a top tiered player. Just some examples- last year Zach Grienke was drafting the 12th round. Mark Reynolds in about the 19th. Cedric Benson in the 6th or 7th. Steve Slaton a year ago and Ben Zobrist last year went undrafted. Conversely, LT, Brian Westbrook, Matt Forte, and Brandon Jacobs were all first rounds picks and they were awful.
The point is, no matter where you draft a closer, you need to make sure that 1) you still need to get value in the other spots you don't draft a closer in and 2) make sure you get a good value and wherever you draft a closer. Also, don't draft a guy like Joe Blow just because "he can get me saves because he's named the closer"
But I will let you loyal reader decide for yourself which approach you think you should use.
Click here for my argument to "overpay" for saves
Click here for DME's argument to not overpay for saves
The key to any draft and any draft strategy is just picking the right talent in each individual round. Just because Yahoo! or ESPN or whatever site you're using to draft ranks a player 122 or what have you, doesn't necessarily that player will end up being the 122 best player. That player might end up being a top tiered player. Just some examples- last year Zach Grienke was drafting the 12th round. Mark Reynolds in about the 19th. Cedric Benson in the 6th or 7th. Steve Slaton a year ago and Ben Zobrist last year went undrafted. Conversely, LT, Brian Westbrook, Matt Forte, and Brandon Jacobs were all first rounds picks and they were awful.
The point is, no matter where you draft a closer, you need to make sure that 1) you still need to get value in the other spots you don't draft a closer in and 2) make sure you get a good value and wherever you draft a closer. Also, don't draft a guy like Joe Blow just because "he can get me saves because he's named the closer"
But I will let you loyal reader decide for yourself which approach you think you should use.
Click here for my argument to "overpay" for saves
Click here for DME's argument to not overpay for saves
Why I "Overpay" For Saves
There are certain philosophies in fantasy sports that we have just deemed them to true. You must draft a RB with your first pick in fantasy football. If you have the number one pick, you must draft what Yahoo!/ESPN tells you is the #1 pick, and don't over pay for saves. Well I'm here to save you baby birds, do what works for you. You drafted AD with your #1 pick, you're slightly ticked off. If you drafted two wide outs like Andre Johnson and Larry Fitzgerald in the first two rounds, you're probably pretty happy. And if you overpay for a closer in fantasy baseball, that's perfectly alright as well.
Don't get me wrong, I understand the logic behind not paying for saves. Closers lose their jobs all the time and get injured in baseball, that you almost always can find saves on the waiver wire. You shouldn't waste a higher round draft pick on a closer when you can just a closer that's just as good later. That makes sense, but there's a big assumption we're making here. We're assuming that closers you get in the later rounds or in FA, will be closers you want. Plus, you're assuming that you will be able to get these closers. No matter how good the closers are on a manager's team, once a player is announced they will get save opportunities, every team in your league will scramble to get that player. There will always be players like Andrew Bailey and Ryan Franklin last year that will be the types of closers you want and can get, but think about what the chances are that you did get those players? Out of all the closers that were available for anyone in your league to pick up, what were the odds really that you picked up the right guy?
That's why I like overpaying for saves. I like to draft at least one of the top tiered guys so I always will have stability in my RP role. Last year, I drafted Mariano Rivera, which worked out splendidly for me, as I was the league leader in saves in that league. I of course waited to draft other closers, but I broke this seemingly cardinal rule of overpaying for saves. Here's an even better example. I was in a league last year where a guy drafted Mo, Jonathan Papelbon, and Joe Nathan. These three guys were the top three ranked closers in the beginning of the draft- this guy really over payed for saves. He ended up winning the league. His other pitchers were Mark Buerhle, Chris Carpenter, Edwin Jackson, Ted Lilly and Roy Halladay. He also had a damn fine offense with Raul Ibanez, Albert Pujols, Derek Jeter, and Robinson Cano.
Here's another example. In another league I was in, the only RP the guy had at the end of the year was Brian Deunsing. He took the no closer approach. He also won the league. He clearly didn't overpay for saves and it helped this guy out as well.
The point I'm trying to make is that it does not matter where you draft a closer. If you draft your first closer in the fourth round, eighth round, twelfth round, or not at all, that's fine. The key to any draft is to just find value at each position and to pick up the correct players off of the waiver wire. There's no reason you can't overpay for a closer and still get other great top tiered guys in the later rounds.
Last year, Jonathan Broxton, David Aardsma, and Heath Bell were all top ten RP and you could have gotten them MUCH later in your draft. But the best RP was Joe Nathan (2nd off the board in most leagues) and the 3rd best was Mo (3rd off the board in most leagues). If I take the 3rd closer off the board, and he ends up being the 3rd best closer in the league, then I got exactly what I expected out of my player when I drafted him. I want every player that I draft to be the best at his position. If that guys happens to be a guy like Ryan Zimmerman or Mark Reynolds, then fine, wait to get that guy later. But a player is the best at his position, and if you have to drat him in a higher round, why not still go after the best player?
You can obviously win your league by overpaying for saves and lose it by waiting to draft saves. If you think you can wait five more rounds to get a top tier closer, be my guest. If that approach works for you, far be it from me to step on your shoes. But it shouldn't be this hard and fast rule that everyone should apply. And frankly, I like the stability of "wasting" my pick on a top tiered guy.
Don't get me wrong, I understand the logic behind not paying for saves. Closers lose their jobs all the time and get injured in baseball, that you almost always can find saves on the waiver wire. You shouldn't waste a higher round draft pick on a closer when you can just a closer that's just as good later. That makes sense, but there's a big assumption we're making here. We're assuming that closers you get in the later rounds or in FA, will be closers you want. Plus, you're assuming that you will be able to get these closers. No matter how good the closers are on a manager's team, once a player is announced they will get save opportunities, every team in your league will scramble to get that player. There will always be players like Andrew Bailey and Ryan Franklin last year that will be the types of closers you want and can get, but think about what the chances are that you did get those players? Out of all the closers that were available for anyone in your league to pick up, what were the odds really that you picked up the right guy?
That's why I like overpaying for saves. I like to draft at least one of the top tiered guys so I always will have stability in my RP role. Last year, I drafted Mariano Rivera, which worked out splendidly for me, as I was the league leader in saves in that league. I of course waited to draft other closers, but I broke this seemingly cardinal rule of overpaying for saves. Here's an even better example. I was in a league last year where a guy drafted Mo, Jonathan Papelbon, and Joe Nathan. These three guys were the top three ranked closers in the beginning of the draft- this guy really over payed for saves. He ended up winning the league. His other pitchers were Mark Buerhle, Chris Carpenter, Edwin Jackson, Ted Lilly and Roy Halladay. He also had a damn fine offense with Raul Ibanez, Albert Pujols, Derek Jeter, and Robinson Cano.
Here's another example. In another league I was in, the only RP the guy had at the end of the year was Brian Deunsing. He took the no closer approach. He also won the league. He clearly didn't overpay for saves and it helped this guy out as well.
The point I'm trying to make is that it does not matter where you draft a closer. If you draft your first closer in the fourth round, eighth round, twelfth round, or not at all, that's fine. The key to any draft is to just find value at each position and to pick up the correct players off of the waiver wire. There's no reason you can't overpay for a closer and still get other great top tiered guys in the later rounds.
Last year, Jonathan Broxton, David Aardsma, and Heath Bell were all top ten RP and you could have gotten them MUCH later in your draft. But the best RP was Joe Nathan (2nd off the board in most leagues) and the 3rd best was Mo (3rd off the board in most leagues). If I take the 3rd closer off the board, and he ends up being the 3rd best closer in the league, then I got exactly what I expected out of my player when I drafted him. I want every player that I draft to be the best at his position. If that guys happens to be a guy like Ryan Zimmerman or Mark Reynolds, then fine, wait to get that guy later. But a player is the best at his position, and if you have to drat him in a higher round, why not still go after the best player?
You can obviously win your league by overpaying for saves and lose it by waiting to draft saves. If you think you can wait five more rounds to get a top tier closer, be my guest. If that approach works for you, far be it from me to step on your shoes. But it shouldn't be this hard and fast rule that everyone should apply. And frankly, I like the stability of "wasting" my pick on a top tiered guy.
Saves
In fantasy baseball, saves are overrated. With picks like Papelbon early, players pay high for 10% (in a 5x5 standard) of their impact points. When four category players like Curtis Granderson are still on the board, it is silly to waste a pick on a guy who will surely rack up saves and slightly help your ratios when you know that late in the draft there will be no 3/4 category players left, buts still plenty of guys who will get you saves and not hurt your ratios.
In the large scheme of things, the average RP tosses what, 70 innings? Most players employ 2-3 closers, depending on both the quality and availability of closers in the draft/free agency pool. Even with 3 guys, the average total impact of those relievers would be 210 IP, the innings equivalent of what a top 30 starter would toss. Assuming an 1800 IP limit that come standard in a Yahoo roto league, that cumulative 210 IP comprises less than 12% of your team's total innings allocation. A combined RP core with a 3.00 ERA, 180 K, 210 IP, 1.10 WHIP line (with some scattered Ws here and there) would slightly help a team whose starting pitching core were to average a 3.75 ERA, 165 K, 1.3 WHIP and 190 IP per SP (based on what it takes to win according to Roto Authority) by boosting some average ratios, but how much would adding an inferior RP core that racked up a comparable amount of saves across the same IP hurt a team?
Let's say instead of drafting Papelbon, Mariano Rivera and Bobby Jenks (a combined 120 SVs) last year, you drafted Brian Wilson, Kevin Gregg and George Sherrill (a combined 102 SVs)? You would not necessarily clear the saves category for 10 points, but you would still be in a prime position to rack up respectable saves numbers with late round draft picks. While last year Papelbon (49 ADP), Rivera (72 ADP) and Jenks (107 ADP) combined for a valuable 2.11 ERA (47 ER), 14 W, 120 SV, 192 K, .90 WHIP line across roughly 202 IP, Gregg (292 ADP), Sherrill (237 ADP) and Wilson (155 ADP) combined for a 4.41 (90 ER), 13 W, 102 SV, 183 K, 1.40 WHIP in about 184 IP. While the latter groups line isn't nearly as pretty as the elite RP's line, the variance between the two groups is much more overstated that you'd expect, based on 2009 ADP.
quick sidenote: obviously some changes to this grouping would need to be made on the basis of facts like Sherrill being replaced by Chris Ray midseason or Kevin Gregg not being the closer (even though he should, allowing the Cubs to continue to maximize Marmol's use in high leverage situations), but these guys could easily be substituted for late round 2009 closers like Chad Qualls (204 ADP) or Joel Hanrahan (198 ADP); the general point of this argument remains the same.
As you might observe, the difference in counting stats productions between these two groups of RPs in 2008 was somewhat negigible. 9 Ks and 1 W is more the byproduct of circumstance than opportunity. As noted earlier, being 18 SVs short of 3 of the top 5 closers going into 2008 with late round picks would put you in prime position to stay competitive in the SVs category.
The combined line of the elite RP core would surely improve your teams ratios to better approach "what it takes to win", but at the cost of 3/4 category offensive guys. On the other hand, the 4.40 ERA over 184 IP accumulated by the inferior RP core would constitute a 10.2% impact on all 1800 IP, causing a 3.75 ERA line to rise to 3.81. By contrast, the elite RP core's impact would constitute 11.2% of all IP and lower ERA from 3.75 to a 3.56 line. A similar impact is observable on WHIP (the elite RP core lowers whip to 1.25, the inferior RP core increases WHIP to 1.31).
What we can observe here is that while the elite RP core does positively impact pitching statistics, the inferior RP core simultaneously NEGLIGIBLY impacts the pitching line -- while the superior RP core lowers ERA well below the projected "what it takes to win" threshold (while also lowering WHIP a sizeable chunk), the inferior RP core only increases ERA by .06 and whip by .01. With smart drafting of SPs (who have much more impact on cumulative pitching statistics than RPs, mind you), this tiny impact of the inferior RP core could easily be offset, while gaining the benefit of a 3/4 category hitter or two early in the draft (by forgoing the elite RP in favor of an "inferior one").
What is very roughly observable here is the overrated impact of RPs based on draft position. Inferior RPs can easily put up comparable counting stats without hurting your ratios if you draft smart. Comparatively, late game hitters (minus sleepers, which can be harder to effectively forecast) generally cannot produce comparable offensive numbers to early round hitters. Come picks 180+, the hitters left in the pool are generally one category guys and offensive gambles. If you go with an early RP, late hitter strategy, you are maximizing risk (by forgoing more reliable/valuable hitters) and minimizing overall return, which is somewhat irrational in the investment game known as drafting. Smarter investment would call for the strategy of simply ignoring RPs until the later rounds (or just ignoring saves all together and focusing on the other 9 categories; why not try maximizing 90% of your potential against balancing 100%? It is equally as viable if done properly).
A lot of this knowledge is "conventional wisdom" for baseball drafters; I'm just putting some rough numbers behind the assertion. Now that that is established, let's move on to the point of my post: rules of thumb for drafting Closers (btw, I should go back in my post to modify all references to RPs as CLs, but you can infer what I mean and as I mentioned earlier, I'm lazy).
If it isn't obvious by now, I think closers are overrated. I rarely draft them (because so many guys lose their jobs midseason), but when I do, I like to look for bargains. I look for guys who meet the following criteria (in this order):
1) Job security
2) Save opportunity potential
First and foremost, if you are going to draft a closer, you want to draft a guy who is going to close. Why waste a pick on a guess (ie, who is closing in Seattle for 2009) when you can probably pick up the person who the closer out of spring training loses the job to off of waivers within a week or two? Why also waste a pick on a closer who has a better RP who may unseat him from the closing role behind him? To me, it seems like a waste of a pick that you could spend gambling on a guy like Denard Span or Shin-Soo Choo.
Secondly, I like a guy who is going to get the chance to save games. This doesn't mean a closer for an offensive friendly team like the Red Sox or Yankees, but closers for teams like The Pirates and Royals, where every one of their 70 wins per season is a save opportunity. Last year, I got Matt Capps, Joakim Soria and Brian Wilson at incredibly discounted prices and they paid off big time.
If you want my recommendation of who to draft, I'd recommend Brandon Lyon (because no one in Detroit is really healthier than him who can throw strikes), Brian Wilson (who has great stuff and no one to unseat him), Heath Bell (the Padres are notoriously committed to keeping their closer the closer during the season, no matter how hard he struggles) and Grant Balfour (the healthier, younger, better option for Tampa; Balfour for Closer is as inevitable as was Obama for President).
That's all for now; it's late and I'm tired. Apologies for spelling/grammar errors; I just wrote this from beginning to end in one sitting and am (yes, you guessed it) too lazy to re-read/edit tonight.
What we can observe here is that while the elite RP core does positively impact pitching statistics, the inferior RP core simultaneously NEGLIGIBLY impacts the pitching line -- while the superior RP core lowers ERA well below the projected "what it takes to win" threshold (while also lowering WHIP a sizeable chunk), the inferior RP core only increases ERA by .06 and whip by .01. With smart drafting of SPs (who have much more impact on cumulative pitching statistics than RPs, mind you), this tiny impact of the inferior RP core could easily be offset, while gaining the benefit of a 3/4 category hitter or two early in the draft (by forgoing the elite RP in favor of an "inferior one").
What is very roughly observable here is the overrated impact of RPs based on draft position. Inferior RPs can easily put up comparable counting stats without hurting your ratios if you draft smart. Comparatively, late game hitters (minus sleepers, which can be harder to effectively forecast) generally cannot produce comparable offensive numbers to early round hitters. Come picks 180+, the hitters left in the pool are generally one category guys and offensive gambles. If you go with an early RP, late hitter strategy, you are maximizing risk (by forgoing more reliable/valuable hitters) and minimizing overall return, which is somewhat irrational in the investment game known as drafting. Smarter investment would call for the strategy of simply ignoring RPs until the later rounds (or just ignoring saves all together and focusing on the other 9 categories; why not try maximizing 90% of your potential against balancing 100%? It is equally as viable if done properly).
A lot of this knowledge is "conventional wisdom" for baseball drafters; I'm just putting some rough numbers behind the assertion. Now that that is established, let's move on to the point of my post: rules of thumb for drafting Closers (btw, I should go back in my post to modify all references to RPs as CLs, but you can infer what I mean and as I mentioned earlier, I'm lazy).
If it isn't obvious by now, I think closers are overrated. I rarely draft them (because so many guys lose their jobs midseason), but when I do, I like to look for bargains. I look for guys who meet the following criteria (in this order):
1) Job security
2) Save opportunity potential
First and foremost, if you are going to draft a closer, you want to draft a guy who is going to close. Why waste a pick on a guess (ie, who is closing in Seattle for 2009) when you can probably pick up the person who the closer out of spring training loses the job to off of waivers within a week or two? Why also waste a pick on a closer who has a better RP who may unseat him from the closing role behind him? To me, it seems like a waste of a pick that you could spend gambling on a guy like Denard Span or Shin-Soo Choo.
Secondly, I like a guy who is going to get the chance to save games. This doesn't mean a closer for an offensive friendly team like the Red Sox or Yankees, but closers for teams like The Pirates and Royals, where every one of their 70 wins per season is a save opportunity. Last year, I got Matt Capps, Joakim Soria and Brian Wilson at incredibly discounted prices and they paid off big time.
If you want my recommendation of who to draft, I'd recommend Brandon Lyon (because no one in Detroit is really healthier than him who can throw strikes), Brian Wilson (who has great stuff and no one to unseat him), Heath Bell (the Padres are notoriously committed to keeping their closer the closer during the season, no matter how hard he struggles) and Grant Balfour (the healthier, younger, better option for Tampa; Balfour for Closer is as inevitable as was Obama for President).
That's all for now; it's late and I'm tired. Apologies for spelling/grammar errors; I just wrote this from beginning to end in one sitting and am (yes, you guessed it) too lazy to re-read/edit tonight.
